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Power Capabilities and Cross-Border Dissemination in Multinational Corporations: The influence of Internationally-Assigned Managers
This paper proposes that internationally assigned managers possess various power capabilities, which if employed strategically can facilitate smooth transfer and operationalisation of policies and practices within the foreign subsidiaries of multinational corporations (MNCs).  Utilizing Lukes’ (1974) power model, it is argued that managers’ unique international status, vast knowledge access and control over verbal information networks allow them to exercise power on various dimensions and influence the behaviour and interests of various local actors. The effectiveness of IA-managers within the global arena has been recognised as crucial to the success of international business (Tung, 1984; Young and Hamil, 1992; Dowling et al., 2008; Harzing and Pennington, 2011). Hence, in an effort to further theoretical development within this particular academic sub-field, the ways in which IA-managers can employ their power resources and the potential outcomes of these endeavours will be conceptualised and put forward for empirical examination.
Introduction: 
Although the diffusion of management practices across borders has been identified as a key source of competitive advantage for multinational companies (MNCs) (Lado and Wilson, 1994), a myriad of macro-institutional and micro-organisational factors makes this process far from straight forward (Ferner et al, 2012). These firms have been described as ‘highly complex configurations’ characterised by continuous power conflicts among various internal and external groups, functions and operating units (Morgan and Kristensen, 2006, p.8; Dörrenbächer and Geppert, 2011; Edwards and Bélanger, 2009; Ferner and Tempel, 2006). Morgan and Kristensen (2006) believed that out of such conflicts emerged temporary power balances which shape formal organisational relationships and work processes. Where the degree of ‘institutional distance’ (ID)- that is diverging institutional arrangements between the home country and the host environment- is significant, neo-institutionalists viewed the smooth transmission of practices as being further challenged (Kostova, 1999; 2002). Within this largely fragmented environment, the role of the internationally assigned (IA) managers is deemed crucial to the implementation of MNC strategy through the global dissemination of knowledge, and coordination and control mechanisms (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977; Harzing 2001a; Martinez and Jarillo, 1991; Minbaeva and Michailova, 2004; Paik and Sohn, 2004). In the face of ‘isormorphic’ pressures (Dimaggio and Powell, 1991) and micro-organisational politics, however, literature concerning the power resources employed by this unique group to actualize headquarter mandates is scarce. Hence, this article aims to put forward a conceptual framework for empirical study in the hope of advancing theoretical development on the impact of IA managers in the global arena.
 There is an increasing amount of literature addressing issues of power, conflicts and competing interests within the MNC setting (Stinchcombe, 1997; Ferner and Tempel, 2006; Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2011), as scholars acknowledge the way in which  specific configurations of power capabilities influence the transfer process (Ferner et al 2012). Applying Jenkins’ (2009: 140) definition, power is seen as the many and varied ways in which humans, whether individually or collectively, achieve their objectives, and assist or obstruct others in the achievement of theirs. Lukes (1974) believed that power was essentially a contested concept, which inevitably involved continual disputes with regard to its utilization by those who possessed it (Lukes, 1974). In an attempt to supplement the ‘one-dimensional’ suppositions on power by behavioural theorists, he proposed a three-dimensional model, which conceptualised power as  exercised not only through decision-making, but also non-decision-making and the ability to shape the desires and interests of subordinate individuals. While the first dimension focuses on the overt display of power in situations of observable conflict (see Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), the second dimension (non-decision-making) highlights the ‘covert’ face of power, that is the ability of power holders to ‘limit those issues that were contested or even discussed’ (Thompson and McHugh, 2002).  Within the third dimension, Lukes declared that power should also be measured by the ability to embed into the minds of individuals, those interests that may be contrary to their own desires and benefit (Luke, 1974). Unlike the first two dimensions, where conflict is present, subordinates are often unaware of their own ‘real’ interests (Lukes, 1974, p.284), which are cleverly shaped and manipulated by power holders. In this paper, Luke’s perspective on power (Lukes, 1974) will be adopted in order to outline the various power capabilities of IA-managers and how they can be utilized to effectuate the transfer process. As will be explained further below, it is believed that such capabilities are derived not only from their unique international status, but also their access to knowledge resources at both headquarter and subsidiary level, and control over established information networks. 
Power Capabilities of Internationally Assigned-Managers
Multinational firms often deploy managers internationally in an effort to cultivate innovation and knowledge sharing, and dismantle functional boundaries (Dowling et al., 2008). They are a key means of achieving coordination and control, occupying key positions within a foreign unit thereby creating a communication channel between headquarters and the unit (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977). Initiating personal or cultural control (Harzing, 2001a) may consist of ensuring that policies are implemented in the way that headquarters intended (See Mtar, 2001). However, should headquarter directives conflict with the interests and agenda of various groups within the foreign unit, then subsidiary actors may initiate various strategic responses to undermine the transfer process (Oliver 1991; Ferner et al., 2012). Although, several factors determine the extent of challenges or success is experienced in the transfer process, it is possible that IA-managers possess specific power capabilities that can facilitate smooth transfer. Lukes (1974) power model will be used to demonstrate this.
International Status: Authority as Power
It will be proposed that IA-managers possess the capabilities to exercise power on all three of Lukes’ (1974) power dimensions. Their first available power resource may be derived from their position of authority not only as managers within the local subsidiary but as representatives of head office, often perceived as the highest source of power and authority within MNCs (Anderssen and Holm, 2010). Parsons (1956) viewed authority as granting a consensual ‘power to’ structure the behaviour of others. Similarly, French and Raven (1959, p.67) labelled authority ‘legitimate power’, where power is derived from the individual’s hierarchical position.  Hence, within Lukes’ first dimension, the decision-making realm, managers possess the ability to directly influence the actions of subordinates through direct enforcement of company policies.  In her application of Lukes’ model to the business environment, Hardy (1996) noted that power in this realm was derived from control over rewards and sanctions, which could influence individual behaviour in the presence of conflict. As such, the higher up IA-managers move along the organisational hierarchy, the more authoritative power they accrue. 
The capacity of IA-managers to make crucial decisions stems primarily from their position within the subsidiary hierarchical structure, and is increased according to where they sit in this hierarchy. Yet the perception of power emanating from their designated role, in addition to being perceived as a head office representative, may foster compliance among those in lower positions. Drawing from Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) typology on power, Lukes noted that authority produced compliance because subordinates recognised the power holder’s authority as legitimate and reasonable in terms of their own values.  Compliance, however, does not merely result out of fear of retribution, but also the perceived ability to satisfy their own self-interests through establishing relationships with IA-managers. Thompson and McHugh (2002) declared that, as in the wider society, power within organisations was shaped by the scarcity of resources.  Hence, if local actors conclude that IA-managers are capable of extending their resource chain, then they may be willing to ‘acquiesce’ (Oliver, 1991, p.152) in an effort to procure additional benefits. Such opportunistic behaviour, however, may be regulated by the foreign unit’s level of dependency on the support of the parent organisation (Rosenzweig and Singh, 1991; Kostova and Roth, 2002). Moreover, compliance may take the form of ‘ceremonial adoption’ (Kostova and Roth, 2002, p.216) as opposed to internalisation of the transferred practices and values. Nonetheless, it is also possible that IA-managers can successfully embed headquarter practices and values through the deployment of additional power capabilities, as will be discussed below. 
Knowledge Access of IA-Managers
The authority of IA-managers may be sufficient for those subordinates who themselves possess little power to exercise, but it may have little sway with other more powerful institutional ‘constituents’, which include not only actors within the subsidiary, but also the state, professions, specific interest groups and public opinion (Scott, 1987b, p.114).  As pointed out by resource dependence theorists (Pfeffer, 1982; Scott and Meyer, 1983), there are several sources of external power, all of which place various demands on global firms. Hence, IA-managers require more than a ‘conveyed title’ to successfully execute and sustain headquarter strategic aims. Among the other sources of power available to this specific group is the possession of and vast access to expert knowledge, gained primarily from straddling national boundaries (Kostova and Roth, 2003). In addition to their relational and adaptive abilities, candidates for these roles are selected based on their technical expertise, and firm knowledge (Harris and Brewster, 1999a; Morley and Flynn, 2003; Sparrow et al, 2004; Harzing and Pennington, 2011). When used for knowledge transfer, these individuals transmit knowledge from the parent company to the subsidiary, and act as agents for the acquisition of host country knowledge (Delios and Bjorkman, 2000), thus creating more opportunities for innovation and learning by exposing the company to new ideas, cultures and experiences.
While the authority of IA-managers may bestow significant power within Lukes’ first dimension, the possession of rare and diverse knowledge allows them to exercise power in all three dimensions. In situations where their authority is challenged at a local level, expertise specific to the firm and industry may grant them additional bargaining power to influence the decision-making process. Lukes (1974) saw such challenges as a key means of testing the capacity of power-holders to affect outcomes. Should IA-managers be able to successfully articulate the nature of and rationale behind transferred policies and practices, as well as draw upon their local knowledge to outline how they impact the wider institutional environment, then they may indeed succeed in influencing varied local constituents. As far as the non-decision-making dimension is concerned, such expert knowledge can be used to suffocate conflicting subordinate demands before they are even expressed. Lukes (1974) believed this occurred when power-holders were able to shape agendas to prevent contentious issues from being brought to the forefront. Drawing on Bachrach and Baratz’s (1962) work, he postulated that the ability to ‘mobilise bias’ was inherent in greater access to institutional resources, values and even the language of legitimacy (Thompson and McHugh, 2002, p.128). As such, those managers with access to various pools of knowledge, locally and across the globe, are in a better position to have their demands met through ‘manipulating’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) and strategically combining key pieces of information to smother alternative preferences.
Subordinates’ perception of managers’ level of expertise regarding specific technical processes, may also result in a reluctance to challenge these processes, and willingness to accept distinct and untested models introduced by expatriate managers. As French and Raven (1959) noted, knowledge in the form of power confers a type of legitimacy upon its owner. Acquiescence, however, may be regulated by the dominance of the MNC’s national business system, as well as its dominance within the particular sector in which it operates (Ferner et al., 2012). Moreover, through the socialization of key subunit actors, IA-managers could shape the values and beliefs of subsidiary actors as well as specific external groups.  Indeed, Lukes believed that conflict was not always a prerequisite to the manifestation of power, but that power was also exercised by influencing and determining individuals’ desires and interests (Lukes, 1974; Thompson and McHugh, 2002).  Dahl (1957) also contended that leaders do not merely respond to the preferences of constituents but they also shape those preferences. Hence, the behaviour of local actors may be driven by instilled organisational, or managerial, values and practices, as opposed to their own inherent interests.
An in-depth knowledge of the host environment also puts IA-managers in a position to influence ‘power of meaning’ (Hardy, 1996, p.7), that is managing the meanings which other organisational actors attach to specific actions, symbols and events. In an earlier study on expatriates’ control function, Paik and Sohn (2004) suggested that local knowledge was crucial to diffusing tension between local staff and head office representatives.  Indeed, Kostova (1999) noted that smooth transmission of head office knowledge may be affected by regulatory, cognitive or normative elements within the home or host environment. Ferner et al. (2012) further posited that these could be exploited by unit actors to challenge the dominant actor’s power of meaning within the MNC. However, it is possible that an acute understanding of local cultural and institutional norms could provide IA-managers with a means through which they can challenge, negotiate and re-construct the meaning of long-held precepts of subunit employees and other local actors. Moreover, in the face of local conflict and mistranslation of head office policies or practices, they can contest or ‘counter-interpret’ (Ferner et al., 2012, p.12) the suppositions of those actors who aim to undermine the transfer process.
Control Over Verbal Information Networks
Yet another power capability available to IA-managers is control over established verbal information networks, which not only provides valuable sub-unit knowledge, but also a means through which they can procure additional resources (Baker, 1990; Burt, 1992). IA-managers are typically used by head office to create such information networks in which they are strategically placed, establishing key social ties between the head office and its foreign units, and bringing crucial resources together that may be located in distant territories (Fernandez and Barr, 1993; Au and Fakuda, 2002; Reiche, Harzing and Kraimer, 2009). By doing this, they also establish formal and informal relationships with actors within and outside the firm (Rempel, Holmes and Zanna, 1985; Kostova and Roth, 2003). Opportunities for informal communication were often facilitated through team projects, task forces, and committees (Galbraith and Kanzanjian, 1986), and supplemented by less structured communication which occurred during management trips, corporate meetings or conferences (Martinez and Jarillo, 1991). Through global and local establishment of strong, trustworthy network-relationships, managers may significantly increase their degree of ‘social capital’, that is the benefits derived from membership within specific social networks (Porter, 1998, p.6). Similar to their vast knowledge access, these networks allow them to affect power in all three of Lukes’ (1974) dimensions. 
Kostova and Roth (2003) believed that international assignees were also capable of influencing the degree of social capital within the subunits of multinational firms (Reiche, Harzing and Kraimer, 2009). Similarly, Reiche et al. (2009) noted that international assignees, in the capacity of ‘knowledge brokers’ (p. 510), could link their home and host social networks, therefore facilitating access between previously unconnected knowledge resources. This may bolster their decision-making power as control over such networks could significantly increase their bargaining power within the organisation, as well as with local external groups whose interests may conflict with head office objectives. Indeed, Inkpen and Tsang (2005) listed influence and preferential opportunities for new business as two of the benefits of being able to tap into these information networks. It may be also possible for IA-managers to utilize established networks to gain favour with specific interest groups who can assist in furthering the strategic mandates of headquarters. Moreover, should managers be able to influence key institutional actors who possess significant influence over sub-unit actors, then they can affect the degree of organisational transfer, increasing the possibility of ‘internalization’, that is the embeddedness of practices into sub-unit employees’ cognitive and normative frames (Kostova, 1999), as opposed to mere ceremonial adoption.  Whether these networks are used, however, for personal of professional gain, as opposed to the overall good of the organisation, would depend of the motivations of individual managers (Adler and Kwon, 2002; Kostova and Roth, 2003).
Control of verbal information networks can also be a key means of ensuring that specific issues with the potential to challenge head office strategic aims are pushed out of the forefront or labelled ‘taboo’ areas, and hence kept out of the sub-unit agenda. Strong and trustworthy relationships with influential institutional constituents, who can aid in the articulation and promotion of head office objectives, as well as the suppression of contesting notions, would provide IA-managers with non-decision-making power (Lukes, 1974). This, however, may be highly contingent on the extent to which the aims of IA-managers and head office are concurrent with the interests of these powerful local actors. Subsidiaries are often embedded within their local institutional environment from which they obtain crucial resources, and with which there have established business relationships (Anderssen and Forsgren, 1996). In this case, strength of either party’s relationships as well as the benefits associated with these relationships, could determine whose interests are advocated. 
Power Capabilities and Institutional Distance
Finally, several scholars have acknowledged that significant institutional distance between head office’s and the sub-unit’s host environment presents increased difficulty in establishing legitimacy and transferring routines and practices into the foreign environment (Kostova, 1996,1999; Xu and Shenkar, 2002; Kostova and Roth, 2002). When operating across borders, the authority of multinational firms may be challenged by competing affirmations to legitimacy in different national institutional domains (Ferner and Temple, 2006).   Where interests diverge, however, specific resources could be employed by IA-managers to help circumvent opposition in order to ensure that transfer occurs in line with head office objectives. The ability to tap into different knowledge reservoirs (Zander and Kogut, 1995) and verbal information networks across various geographic locations could extend an array of solutions to local contestation of organisational rules, norms and values. Hence, in the wake of conflict between proposed headquarter structures or practices and local institutional frameworks, far-reaching knowledge regarding local institutional values and requirements, coupled with expert organisational knowledge, could facilitate negotiation and compromise among the most pertinent interest groups in an effort to satisfy diverse needs. It must be said that in doing this, there is a risk that the original aim of the transferred practice or policy may be deflected. However, the resultant ‘hybridization’ (Szulanski and Jensen, 2006) may prove to be more beneficial and practical within the local setting (Ferner et al., 2012). Furthermore, it could lead to knowledge acquisition as novel and innovative organisational methods may be birthed through managers’ efforts to implement existing routines.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the role of IA-managers in the transfer of head office policies and practices, and employed the Lukesian perspective on power (Lukes, 1974) to outline a number of power capabilities available to these individuals, and how they might be used to facilitate smooth transfer.  The three main resources highlighted were their unique international status, vast access of expert knowledge, and control over verbal information networks. It was suggested that the IA-managers hierarchical position within the sub-unit, as well as their role as head office representatives granted them legitimate authority which extended significant power within Lukes’ decision-making realm (Luke’s, 1974). In acknowledging that this was insufficient to ensure embeddedness of transferred practices, it was further postulated that managers’ access to a diverse array of knowledge resources, gained through straddling boundaries, provided them with the ability to exercise power in all three of Lukes’ dimensions. While allowing them to exercise power in both decision-making and non-decision through demonstrating an in-depth understanding of both organisational and local institutional structures, it also provided the means through which they could shape the desires and interests of local subordinates. This could be achieved through the socialization of key sub-unit actors, and the application of knowledge regarding the host country’s cognitive, normative and regulatory frameworks to challenge, negotiate and re-construct long held precepts and values. The third power capability identified, which also extended power in all of Lukes’ dimensions was control over verbal information networks. By establishing and maintaining strong, trustworthy relationships across the organisation and with key local institutional constituents, IA-managers not only increase their degree of social capital, but also their decision-making and non-decision making power within the sub-unit. Their increased influence may be used to ensure that contesting notions are perceived as ‘taboo’ and thus kept off the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Managers can also utilize connections with influential actors to embed specific ideas and values into local cognitive and normative frameworks, thus moulding the desires of subunit and other local actors to suit head office mandates.
To examine the extent to which the power capabilities of managers highlighted within this paper are indeed capable of facilitating smooth transfer of organisational policies and practices, empirical investigation is required. For example, qualitative research, through the use of semi-structured interviews with a selection of IA-managers from a particular MNC, and based in different subunits across the globe, may highlight the various resources implemented by this group to successfully execute their assigned objectives within the sub-unit environment. Such research could identify particular methods that have proven useful in addressing local opposition to the cross-border dissemination within specific territories, as well as additional sources power that might not have been examined in this paper. In advancing this conceptual framework, however, the author acknowledges that several factors interrelate to determine the extent of success experienced in cross-border dissemination (Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2003; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006; Ferner et al., 2012). Hence, although the unique international status, vast knowledge access and control over verbal information networks may extend some power within the local environment, they are not prerequisites to the internalisation of transferred policies or practices. Although these may help to facilitate transfer in institutionally distant locations, for instance, the extent of the institutional distance between the home and the host country may still regulate the success or failure of the transfer. Other factors influencing this process also include the structure and strategy of the MNC, the level of MNC-subunit interdependence, and the personal agendas of various MNC power-holders, including IA-managers (Noorderhaven and Harzing, 2003; Kostova and Roth 2002, 2003; Morgan and Kristensen, 2006). Therefore, future research in this area should make certain that these elements, among others, are taken into consideration.
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